INTRODUCTION
Two weeks before the 1876 presidential election, Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes confided in his diary that "danger is imminent: A contested result. And we have no such means for its decision as ought to be provided by law." ' Hayes could not have imagined how prophetic his words would soon become, for he defeated Samuel Tilden by one electoral vote-185 to 184-only after it was determined that all four contested states-Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina-had cast their votes for Hayes. Tilden's supporters insisted that Democratic votes * Professor, Notre Dame Law School (nagle.8@nd.edu). I am grateful for the excellent assistance provided by the staff of the Notre Dame Law School library, the comments of Joe Bauer, A.J. Bellia, Rick Garnett, Abner Greene, Mike Paulsen, and Bob Rodes on an earlier draft, the suggestions offered by my colleagues at Notre Dame during a faculty colloquium, and the research assistance of Kacy Romig. had been wrongfully ignored in the three Southern states, while the Republican supporters of Hayes complained that African Americans had been intimidated from voting for Hayes in those states. The dispute was not resolved by any of the extant constitutional provisions or federal statutes, but rather by the 8-7 vote of a special commission that Congress established solely for the purpose of resolving the election. Congress accepted that result just before Hayes was inaugurated on March 4, 1877.
Of course, all of this was echoed in the 2000 presidential election, which elicited its own cries of a stolen election and accusations hurled at the parties involved in deciding it, especially the Supreme Court of the United States. The parallels between the 1876 and 2000 elections were recognized in Bush v. Gore 2 itself. Justice Breyer wrote in dissent that the participation in the work of the Electoral Commission by five Justices, including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process. 5 Rehnquist and Morris note the many historical parallels between 1876 and 2000, while identifying some critical differences as well. 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to respond to Justice Breyer's reference to the 1876 election in Bush v. Gore, but Rehnquist does so in his book, defending the work of the Electoral Commission and of the Supreme Court Justices who sat on it. Likewise, while Rehnquist does not specifically address the plea for a law to resolve contested presidential elections that Hayes recorded in his diary shortly before the election of 1876, Rehnquist suggests that any quest for a means of resolving such elections will be in vain. "Perhaps when such a dispute erupts, there is no means of resolving it that will satisfy both sides." '7 Rather than surrendering to that belief, I want to analyze the different institutions that have attempted to resolve disputed elections, sketch the criteria for evaluating their work, and outline the lessons that emerge from the story of the presidential election of 1876 as told by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Roy Morris, Jr.
I. THE ELECTION OF 1876
Rehnquist and Morris tell this story from their differing perspectives as the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States-and thus an active participant in the disputed 2000 election 8 -and as a popular Civil War historian and political correspondent. Both books provide a rich description of the events that led Hayes, the Republican governor of Ohio, to face Tilden, the Democratic governor of New York, in the general election of 1876, the centennial year of the creation of the United States. 9 Hayes prevailed on the seventh ballot in the Republican Party convention against the early favorite, Maine Representative James G. Blaine-who inspired the eponymous state constitutional "Blaine Amendments" that trouble us to this day'°-because of Blaine's inability to clear his name from a scandal involving his sale of railroad bonds. Tilden had a much easier road to the Democratic nomination as a result of his reputation as a reforming governor who had successfully battled the corruption of Boss Tweed and Tammany Hall in New York City. The general election became a referendum upon two distinct concerns: the widespread corruption of the Grant Administration and the struggle to reestablish state governments throughout the defeated states of the Confederacy. Tilden appealed to those throughout the country who were fed up with the corrupt mess in Washington and to white Southerners who sought to recapture the control of their state governments from Republican carpetbaggers and from newly free African Americans. Hayes was the champion of those who feared the election could undo everything the Civil War-just eleven years past-had achieved for African Americans at the cost of much bloodshed, still vividly remembered by the many Union soldiers now voting in the North. The Republican strategy, as Rehnquist describes it, was "to impress on the electorate that while every Democrat had not been a rebel, every rebel had been a Democrat."
' "I Left unstated was what Morris describes as "a more pressing problem, one that affected everyone. That problem was race." 1 2 Racial violence and threats of racial violence had persisted in the decade after the Civil War, and they increased as both parties sought to win the Southern states whose votes could be critical in a close election.
8. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 9. For an overview of the period and the issues of concern in 1876, see Morris, supra note 5, at 19-45; Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 7-32, 80-93. Biographical sketches of each candidate appear in Morris, supra note 5, at 57-68 (discussing Hayes); id. at 84-108 (discussing Tilden); Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 33-51 (discussing Hayes); id. at 58-79 (discussing Tilden).
10. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 n.7 (2004) (noting the argument that "Washington's Constitution was born of religious bigotry because it contains a so-called 'Blaine Amendment,' which has been linked with anti-Catholicism" Rehnquist observes that as election day approached, " [f] or the first time in twenty years, the Democratic Party in 1876 had at least an even chance of electing its candidate for President.
1 3 Even so, the Chicago Tribune proclaimed that "Republican confidence was never more unwavering than now," though it added an ominous cautionary note: "provided the Confederate Tildenites permit a fair and honest election." 14 Finally, on election day Tilden emerged as the undisputed victor in seventeen states containing a total of 184 electoral votes, and Hayes clearly prevailed in seventeen states with a total of 163 electoral votes. Tilden won all of the former Confederate states that had emerged from reconstruction (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia), the border states (Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland), three Northeastern states (Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York), and the three scattered states of Indiana, Missouri, and West Virginia. Hayes won a belt of states ranging from the West (California, Colorado, and Nevada), through the Plains (Kansas and Nebraska), the Midwest (Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin), and Pennsylvania, plus five states in New England (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont). 15 The winner was unclear in the three Southern states that were still under the control of Republican governments backed by the federal army: Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Additionally, while Hayes won the popular vote by about 1,000 votes in Oregon, one of his electors there was also serving as a deputy postmaster, thus violating the constitutional prohibition upon electors holding federal office.' 6 Hayes would prevail only if he won all twenty of the uncertain electoral votes: Louisiana's eight electoral votes, South Carolina's seven, Florida's four, and the disputed elector in Oregon. Conversely, Tilden would be elected if he captured just one of those twenty electoral votes. The outcome of the 1876 presidential election depended upon who received the most votes. But counting the votes-both the popular votes in each state and the electoral votes of all of the states-was itself a contested exercise. Like 2000, when much of the attention concerned factual and legal disputes about which ballots counted as popular "votes" in Florida, the disputes in 1876 involved questions about which popular and electoral votes were properly included and excluded during the official tabulation. The exercise of judgment in answering those factual and legal questions makes the determination of who counts the votes crucial. Indeed, many of the writers describing the presidential election of 1876 emphasized the "who counts the votes" question. 20 That question raises precisely the sort of structural constitutional issue whose importance is so well explained by Judge Wilkinson. 2 1 Alas, as Rehnquist observes, the counting of votes in presidential elections suffers from the fact that "[t] he Constitution was silent as to who would do the counting. ' 22 20. See Rehnquist and Morris demonstrate the failure of all the efforts to achieve an accepted resolution of the presidential election of 1876. None of the players charged with resolving the election of 1876 acquitted himself well. More tellingly, none of the institutions that had an opportunity to judge the election succeeded in doing so in a manner that settled the question in the popular mind. The stories told by Rehnquist and Morris about the election feature distinct institutions that were in a position to resolve the election: local election officials, state canvassing boards, state court judges, federal court judges, the specially created Electoral Commission, and Congress. Each failed in turn.
A. Local Election Officials
The initial counting of the popular vote was conducted by the local precinct and county officials in each state. In Florida in 1876, for example, the process worked like this:
First, the people vote at various places in the counties. At sunset on election day the precinct polls, as these voting places are called, are closed. The precinct officers count the votes, certify the result and forward that certificate together with the ballots of each precinct to the county seat. When all the precincts of the county are in, a county canvassing board certifies the total result shown by all the precinct reports. This certificate is then sent to the seat of State government, and the ballots themselves are filed at the seat of the county. Moreover, as Tilden himself explained, neither the local precinct officials nor the county officials "has any power or duty but that which is most purely and simply ministerial. They can merely compute from the documents before them, and in their respective returns report the result. ''28 The work of these local officials escaped most of the controversy in 1876, and neither Morris nor Rehnquist emphasizes them.
B. State Canvassing Boards
State law creates canvassing boards-also known as returning boards-that are charged with reviewing the local returns and determining how many votes each candidate receives in an election. Those state canvassing boards were quite new in 1876.29 Neither Rehnquist nor Mor- 28. Writings and Speeches, supra note 24, at 469. 29. Jeremiah Black, the former Attorney General of the United States who served as one of Tilden's counsels before the Electoral Commission, painted a dim view of the new state canvassing boards:
As early as 1870, and before that, the handwriting was seen on the wall which announced that a large and decisive majority of all the votes, black and white, had determined to break up this den of thieves [of corrupt Republicans ruling Southern state governments]. They must therefore prepare for flight or punishment, unless they could contrive a way of defeating the popular will ris has any praise for the activities of the boards that counted the presidential votes in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina in 1876. Charges of partisanship, incompetence, and attempted bribes abounded. In Louisiana, "Tilden's electors had leads of an)where from 6,300 to 8,957 votes" when the state canvassing board began to review the local returns. 3 0 The Republicans, however, insisted that the Tilden votes had been fraudulently exaggerated, and more importantly, that Democratic intimidation denied scores of African Americans their votes. Morris relates that 157 witnesses testified before the board about Democratic abuses, testimony the board believed despite the later indications described by Morris that the claims were fictitious: 3 '
Citing "systematic intimidation, murder, and violence toward one class of voters, white as well as black, of such a character as to have scarcely a parallel in the history of this state," the board threw out the entire votes from East Feliciana and Grant parishes, as well as sixty-nine partial returns from twenty-two other parishes.
3 2
Altogether, the board disallowed 13,211 votes for Tilden and only 2,412 votes for Hayes, thereby allowing Hayes to overcome Tilden's initial lead and carry the state's eight electoral votes.
33
The result was the same in the other two disputed states. In South Carolina, the state canvassing board devoted most of its attention to the governor's race and to the elections to the state legislature, which "was empowered to declare the winner of the gubernatorial contest." 3 4 Hayes held "a narrow margin" in the presidential elector voting, which he retained after the canvassing board completed its work.
3 5 The Florida board acted after Hayes had been declared the victor in Louisiana and South Carolina, so everyone understood the sudden importance of the state's three electoral votes. 3 6 Morris explains that "[t]he chief difficulty whenever and however it should be expressed. Then the Returning Board was invented. This was a machine entirely new, with powers never before given to any tribunal in any State. Its object was not to return, but to suppress, the votes of the qualified electors, or change them to suit the occasion. J.S. Black, The Electoral Conspiracy, 125 N. Am. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1877 facing the canvassing board was the sheer closeness of the numbers, which were subject to challenge-and manipulation-by both sides."
The board's initial count gave Hayes a forty-three vote lead, which produced newspaper headlines throughout the country announcing Hayes as the new President. Tilden then took a ninety-four vote lead when corrected returns were substituted for Baker County.
38 Democrats continued to insist upon the exclusion of 219 Hayes votes allegedly added after the polls closed in Alachua County, 3 9 and one leading Republican observer-"twice-wounded Civil War hero" General Francis Barlow-agreed with them until national Republican officials recalled him from the state. 40 The board kept the 219 votes from Alachua County, and it "ruled in favor of the Republicans" with respect to "[a] llegations [that] ranged from ballot-tampering to illegal participation by black juveniles to improperly filed returns."
41 Thus, shortly after midnight on December 6-the date federal law set for the meeting of the electoral college-the Florida state canvassing board declared that Hayes had won the state by 924
votes.
42

C. State Courts
State courts played a relatively modest role in resolving the 1876 election, especially when compared to the litigation in the Florida courts 124 years later. In both Florida and South Carolina, the state canvassing boards were sued by the disappointed gubernatorial candidates and presidential electors. In December 1876, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of George Drew, the Democratic candidate for governor, holding that the canvassing board had wrongfully disregarded allegedly fraudulent returns. 43 The Tilden electors then filed a quo warranto action in Florida state court as soon as the state canvassing board certified Hayes as Tilden brought peals of laughter from both sides of the room" where the canvassing board met. Id. at 193-94; see also Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 104 (noting that in 1876 "[tlhe population of Key West was 10,000; Jacksonville a little under 7,000; Tallahassee just over 2,000; and Tampa less than 1,000," while "Miami would not even become an incorporated city until 1896").
37 [wihether irregularities or fraud in an election will authorize the rejection of a vote cast, counted and returned in a genuine, bonafide return, is a question of law not within the power of this Board to determine"); see also id. at 61-63 (subsequent opinion of the court rejecting the board's "protest" of the court's decision). the winner.
44 They "obtained a ruling from a state trial court that they were the ones properly chosen, ' '4 5 but the Republicans appealed and the effect of the trial court's decision soon became a contested issue before the federal Electoral Commission. 4 6 In South Carolina, the state supreme court issued an order "to prohibit the [canvassing] board from doing anything other than merely sanction the existing vote totals" in the state legislative elections.
4 7 The board ignored the court's order, so the court ordered the arrest of the board members for contempt of court, but the members were quickly released by a federal writ of habeas corpus. 48 In Rhode Island, where Hayes won an easy victory in the popular vote, the state supreme court ruled in late November 1876 that a Hayes elector was disqualified because he already held another federal office-to wit, a commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission-but the court rejected the suggestion that the elector's position went to the Tilden elector who had come in second in the voting. Instead, the court held that state law vested the authority to replace the elector with the state legislature, which promptly selected another elector for Hayes. 49 
D. Federal Courts
The federal courts had even less of an impact upon the resolution of the 1876 election than the state courts. The statute establishing the Electoral Commission expressly preserved the right of any affected party to initiate litigation arising from the presidential election in federal court. 50 Even so, for reasons that remain unknown, there was no federal litigation 44 . Quo warranto is "[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed." Black's Law Dictionary 1285 (8th ed. 2004); see also Ewing, supra note 27, at 117-30 (defending the propriety of the use of quo warranto to determine Florida's electors in 1876).
45. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 106. 46. See 7 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, at 62 (Supp. 1988) (noting that "on December 6-the day when the Hayes electors cast their votes-an information in quo warranto had been brought in the circuit court for Leon County by the four who claimed to have been elected to vote for Tilden"); id. at 66 (adding that a judgment in the quo warranto case was issued "almost two months later," and "an appeal was pending" while the Electoral Commission met in February 1877 
E. The Electoral Commission
The parties immediately disputed the correct constitutional procedure for the counting of the electoral votes when the lame-duck 46th Congress convened on December 4, 1876.
5 3 The first effort to break the stalemate occurred on December 7, when George W. McCrary, a Republican from Iowa, introduced a resolution calling for the creation of a committee to resolve the crisis. McCrary's resolution asserted that
[i]t is of the utmost importance that all differences of opinion and all doubt and uncertainty upon these questions should be removed, to the end that the votes may be counted and the result declared by a tribunal whose authority none can question and whose decision all will accept as final. resolving the impasse. The joint committee "immediately began discussing plans to name an independent Electoral Commission to adjudicate the crisis and decide who should be the next president.
' 55 The consensus in favor of a special independent commission soon became mired in the determination of the commission's membership. Each proposal to staff the commission with various combinations of members of Congress and Supreme Court Justices was scrutinized for any indication of the ultimate decision that the commission would be likely to produce. Moreover, neither Tilden nor Hayes approved of the commission, preferring to rest upon the force of their respective constitutional claims to the presidency. Tilden particularly objected to a proposal to select the Supreme CourtJustices by lot, remarking that "I may lose the presidency, but I will not raffle for it." 56 Finally, on January 17, 1877, the joint committee agreed upon an electoral commission that would include five senators, five representatives, and five members of the Supreme Court. The ten congressional members were evenly divided among Democrats and Republicans.
57 So were four of the Supreme Court members who were identified by their circuit: Justices Clifford and Field were Democrats (appointed by Presidents Buchanan and Lincoln, respectively) while Justices Miller and Strong were Republicans (both appointed by President Lincoln). The statute empowered those four justices to select a fifth justice who would serve as the fifteenth member of the commission. 58 Justice Davis was supposed to have been the fifth member of the commission because he was widely-though not universally-viewed as an independent. Morris writes that "[n]o one, perhaps not even Davis himself, knew which presidential candidate he preferred." 59 With that understanding, Congress approved the bill to establish the commission, and President Grant The Democratic hopes were dashed on the very day that Congress approved the bill: Justice Davis accepted an appointment to the United States Senate that was offered by the Democratic state legislature of Illinois, and so he declined to serve on the commission. ChiefJustice Waite had already been ruled out by the Democrats, so the four Justices on the 60. Id. To be sure, Morris is not alone in his inability to explain why congressional Democrats supported the creation of the Electoral Commission. Tilden's biographer, writing in 1895, commented that
[h]ow so large a number of the Democrats in Congress were induced to supersede the constitutional machinery for counting the electoral votes, for a device not only unknown to the Constitution, but in all its important bearings inconsistent with it, can only be explained as we explain most of the blunders which are woven into the web of every human life. Some yielded through ignorance, some for want of reflection, some to quiet a controversy about the result of which they were indifferent or apprehensive, some to serve personal ends at home that seemed more important to them than the presidential issue, 62. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 116 (indicating that Hayes viewed the commission as an unconstitutional interference with the Senate's prerogative to determine which votes to count); Diary Entry (Jan. 21, 1877), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 404 (writing that "[t]he leading constitutional objection to it, perhaps, is that the appointment of the Commission by act of Congress violates that part of the Constitution which gives the appointment of all other officers 'to the President'").
63. Louis W. Koenig, The Election That Got Away, Am. Heritage, Oct. 1960, at 6, 99. Thus, comments another observer,
[i]f it was wrong to leave questions to a commission, it was a Democratic wrong. If the mode of choosing the commissioners in the House and Senate was a blunder, it was a Democratic blunder.... In a word, if there was fraud anywhere in the measure, it was the work of an immense majority of the Democrats in both Houses of Congress. Monroe, supra note 20, at 537. commission selected Justice Bradley for the fifth position. Bradley was a New Jersey Republican appointed to the Court by President Grant in 1870. Morris insists that "Bradley had a very large skeleton in his closet," namely an 1870 circuit court ruling in a railroad bankruptcy case that favored Tom Scott, who was now busily lobbying federal officials for funding of a railroad from Texas to the Pacific coast.
6 4 But most contemporary observers viewed Bradley as fairminded and nonpartisan. 65 That perception vanished once the commission actually completed its work. According to the law establishing the commission, on February 1, Congress began counting the electoral votes of each state alphabetically until it reached the four states-Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina-for which there were competing sets of electors. The decision concerning those states was referred to the commission, which heard lengthy arguments from each side on the legal issues presented in the case. Generally, the Hayes supporters insisted that the commission must accept each state's official certification of the canvassing board's determination at face value, while the Tilden advocates "asked the commission to go behind the returns and investigate the true facts of the case."
66
The statute establishing the commission had provided simply that the commission had the same power to count the electoral votes that Congress enjoyed under the Constitution. 67 Nonetheless, Morris recounts the Democratic belief "that a clear majority of the committee [that had devised the commission] had agreed to the premise 'that the action of the [Canvassing] Boards must be inquired into and should be reversed if substantial justice should seem to demand such action,'" a belief that was not reduced to writing and that "the Republicans now denied." 68 Unlike Morris, most historians have treated the failure to define the powers of the commission as a conscious congressional decision to finesse the issue and thus not to prejudge the outcome of the election dispute. As one writer explained, while debating the Electoral Commission bill, the Sen-64. Morris, supra note 5, at 219. 65. See Fairman, supra note 46, at 123 (concluding that "[allong with Waite and Strong, [Bradley] was the least 'political' among the members of the Court"); id. at 124 (quoting a Democratic newspaper in Nashville describing Justice Bradley as "a fair judicial officer from whom a strictly legal opinion is to be expected on a point of law and a fair determination upon a matter of fact"); Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 222 (observing that "Bradley was the closest substitute for a political Independent as could be had among the remaining members of the Court"); Koenig, supra note 63, at 103 (remarking that "Bradley's appointment proceeded with the blessings of [Democratic National Committee chair Abram] Hewitt and even of Tilden"). Rehnquist indicates, however, that not everyone was convinced of Bradley's impartiality. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 159 (quoting a newspaper editorial describing Bradley as "a partisan to whom his party never looked in vain"). ate "voted down, during the same hour of one day, two antagonistic propositions upon this subject; namely, the proposition that the Commission should have the right to go behind the returns from a State, and the proposition that it should not have such right."
69
The ten members of Congress and the four Supreme Court Justices chosen based upon their political affiliations voted as expected, yielding a seven-to-seven split. Justice Bradley cast the tie-breaking eighth vote in favor of the position advanced by Hayes. 70 That vote earned both him, personally, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, the contempt of contemporary Democrats and subsequent historians, who denounced the partisanship of his vote and the entire process. For example, Morris denounces the "fifteen-man Electoral Commission that was every bit as partisan and petty as the shadiest ward heeler in New York City or the most unreconstructed Rebel in South Carolina." 7 1 Rumors emerged that Justice Bradley had switched his vote after a late-night visit from Republican leaders the night before. 72 More tellingly, as noted above, Justice Breyer wrote in his Bush v. Gore dissent that the participation in the work of the electoral commission by five justices, including Justice Bradley, "did not lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process." But Chief Justice Rehnquist is far more forgiving of the episode in his book, defending both the reasonableness of Justice Bradley's legal conclusion and the work of the Electoral Commission. Rehnquist cites "[t]wo contemporaneous sources" that "confirm at least the reasonableness, if not the outright correctness, of Bradley's stance."
74 First, Rehnquist quotes Justice Davis-the quintessential independent-as endorsing Bradley's legal conclusion. Second, Rehnquist reports that a pre-election congressional debate concerning the counting of electoral votes yielded "substantive agreement on both sides of the aisle that in its consideration of an objection Congress could not 'go behind' the certifications sent in by the states," 75 Thanks to the Electoral Commission created by Congress and acquiesced to by Hayes and Tilden, the nation avoided serious disturbance or bloodshed and went about on its business. This outcome was a testament to the ability of the American system of government to improvise solutions to even the most difficult and important problems. Still, the Electoral Commission did not decide the election. It remained for Congress to bless the decision of the commission, which completed its work just four days before the March 4 date then prescribed in the Constitution for the new President's inauguration. 79 The statute establishing the Electoral Commission provided that the commission's decision would be binding unless both houses of Congress overturned it,8 0 and the Republican majority in the Senate had no intention of doing so. The Democrats in the House thus lacked the power to reject the commission's decision, but they retained the ability to filibuster the formal counting of the electoral votes that was necessary to elect Hayes as President. Morris describes how a spurious second certificate, claiming that Vermont-just four states from the end of the alphabet of states-had cast its five electors for Tilden, delayed the proceedings for one critical day. 81 And when the House and Senate separated to consider an unsuccessful challenge to one of the Wisconsin electors for Hayes, a representative from Texas moved to have the House simply elect Tilden as President pursuant to the House's powers under Article I-just as Tilden himself "had been demanding for the past four months.
'8 2 The motion was tabled. 83 The count was completed in the early morning hours of Friday, March 2, but only after frustrated Democrats voiced sentiments such as 76 this: "Today is Friday. Upon that day, the savior of the world suffered crucifixion between two thieves. On this Friday constitutional government, justice, honesty, fair dealing, manhood, and decency suffer crucifixion amid a number of thieves." agreement was more a mutual concession of the obvious than a device for controlling larger events." 8 8
G. Other Alternatives
Several other means of resolving the contested presidential election of 1876 were discussed but not employed. One possibility was for either Hayes or Tilden to relinquish his claim to the presidency, but that suggestion does not appear to have been taken seriously by either candidate or his supporters.
8 9 Alternatively, several observers proposed that a new election be held to produce the definitive result that had failed to emerge from the voting on November 6.90 New elections are a common remedy when the results of the original election are hopelessly uncertain or demonstrably fraudulent.
9 1 But no such proposal gained any traction in 1876 and early 1877, and neither Rehnquist nor Morris even mentions that as a possible solution. A third possibility would have been to decide the election by lot. The closest the discussions in 1876 came to that idea was the proposal to choose the members of the Electoral Commission by lot, but Tilden quickly rejected that idea. 92 It is baffling to imagine the presidency being determined by lot, yet state law sometimes provides for precisely that device for deciding tied elections for other offices today. The final means of deciding the election was the one that all rejected but all feared: The threat of a violent resolution of the conflict pervaded the times. In the words of historian James Ford Rhodes, "[s]ome Senators and Representatives derided the idea of danger; but anyone, who lived through those days in an observing and reflecting mood, or anyone, who will now make a careful study of the contemporary evidence, cannot avoid the conviction that the country was on the verge of civil war." '94 Happily, "aside from an anonymous shot through Hayes's parlor window, no violence was displayed throughout the entire crisis." 9 5 But the fear of a violent resolution of the contested election animated the efforts to find an alternative solution.
Of course, the difficulty in resolving the disputed election could have been avoided by not holding an election. The Constitution does not mandate that the President of the United States be selected by a popular election.
9 6 One state did not hold a presidential election in 1876: Colorado. As Morris relates, Congress approved Colorado's admission as a state on August 1, 1876,just three months before the election. Moreover, "[t]o spare the cost of holding two separate elections less than a month apart, Congress had already authorized the new legislature to choose the state's presidential electors." 97 The Republicans won the election to deRepresentatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J. 1283 (1984) (proposing a system where the winner would be chosen by a random drawing from ballots cast, allowing greater protection of minority rights; a candidate garnering 60% of the popular vote would have a 60% chance of winning overall, but the candidate with 40% of the popular vote would still have a chance to win). 94. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 109 (quoting 7 Rhodes, supra note 26, at 231); see also Diary Entry (Mar. 14, 1877), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 425, 427 (diary entry from President Hayes's first week in office stating that "I do not think the wise policy is to decide contested elections in the States by use of the national army"); Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant and the Electoral Crisis of 1876-1877, Hayes Hist. J., Winter 1992, at 5, 13 (indicating that President Grant "sincerely believed that the Democrats were trying to do on the national level what they had successfully accomplished in several Southern states-subvert the electoral process through terrorism"). [i]t seems probable that the House will begin its efforts at confusion with the Presidential election by trying to deprive Colorado of its character as a State. Some quibble has been invented regarding an informality in the Enabling act, and on the strength of this it is reported that the House will . . . seek to lay the foundation of a plan for throwing out the Electoral votes of that State. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1876, at 6. Apparently nothing ever materialized of that threat, for neither Morris nor Rehnquist even mentions it.
98. Morris, supra note 5, at 155-56. The closeness of the 1876 election had other effects as well. It prompted both political parties to contest every state in the next election, and the resulting pandering to gain California's six electoral votes in 1880 eventually helped produce the Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943), which barred Chinese immigration primarily at the behest of racist Californians. See generally Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (1998).
99. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 5-6. 100. Id.
time without the suspicion that plagued the presidential elections of 1876 and 2000. But we have yet to heed the advice that Hayes offered four days after election day in 1876: "AJI thoughtful people are brought to consider the imperfect machinery provided for electing the president. No doubt we shall, warned by this danger, provide, by amendments of the Constitution, or by proper legislation, against a recurrence of the danger." 10 1 Any more perfect machinery must employ unbiased decisionmakers who are expert in the factual and legal questions that may arise and able to reach a decision in a timely manner.
A. Bias and Independence
The successful resolution of a contested election must achieve fairness to the parties involved and the appearance of fairness to the general public. The avoidance of a biased decisionmaker is perhaps the most fundamental criterion for achieving those goals. The appearance of bias, in turn, is often linked to the independence of the decisionmaker. Partisan affiliation was viewed as nearly dispositive of the conclusion that an individual would reach throughout the 1876 dispute. Even before the election, Senator Bayard expressed his fear that a colleague was over-sanguine in supposing that that day of political millennium has arrived in which he and his party friends, and I and mine, shall be able to look at facts imbued with all the color of party feeling, yet decide them as though we were entirely indifferent to the result of our decision.' 0 2
Charges or assumptions of partisanship attached to each of the institutions that played a role in deciding the presidential election of 1876. The state canvassing boards elicited the most vociferous complaints of partisanship. The board members' political affiliations were frequently noted at the time of the election, and are often mentioned by Rehnquist and Morris. The South Carolina board consisted of five Republican elected officials, including three officials "who ultimately would rule on their own cases" for reelection.
l0 3 The Florida board included two Republicans-the elected Secretary of State and Comptroller-and the elected Democratic Attorney General. Thus, one writer has asserted that " [i] n a complete travesty of integrity, the board voted for Hayes by virtue of its Republican majority." 1 0 4 Morris asserts that "the South Carolina and Florida boards seemed ripe for partisan manipulation" because they "were composed of generally respected, if partisan, individuals," yet those 101. Diary Entry (Nov. 11, 1876), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 374, 377.
102. 7 Fairman, supra note 46, at 56 (quoting Sen. Bayard). 103. Morris, supra note 5, at 177. 104. Louis C. Kleber, The Presidential Election of 1876, 20 Hist. Today 807, 811 (1970); see also Koenig, supra note 63, at 100 ("Never deterred by the weight of the evidence, no matter how overwhelming, the board consistently and ruthlessly used its discretionary powers in favor of the Republicans.").
boards "were pillars of Athenian probity and good governance compared to the Louisiana returning board." 1 05 Four Republicans served on the Louisiana board, and they had neglected their statutory obligation to name a Democrat to the remaining fifth spot on the board that had been vacated when the sole Democrat "had resigned two years earlier, charging the board with rampant corruption.
1 0 6 Rehnquist agrees that "[t]he composition of the [Louisiana] board was not one to inspire confidence in the Democrats," and that "there was strong evidence that at least in Louisiana a partisan returning board had fraudulently disallowed more than enough returns to deny [Tilden] the state's electoral votes." 10 7
"The charge against the board," explains Rehnquist, "was not simply incompetence, or negligence, but fraud-deliberate tampering with the returns to produce the outcome desired by the board."
10 8 Morris provides abundant evidence that the members of the canvassing boards in Florida, South Carolina, and especially Louisiana acted in pursuit of the partisan interests, which Rehnquist never really denies. 109 The few state courts involved in the 1876 presidential election fared somewhat better in the court of popular opinion. "Surprisingly," Morris writes, "the all-Republican" South Carolina state supreme court ruled that the state canvassing board had wrongfully thrown out thousands of votes for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate.
1 0 But while the small role that the courts played in deciding the election generated little controversy, the bitter complaints of partisanship aimed at the five Supreme Court Justices who sat on the Electoral Commission show that judges were hardly immune from claims or assumptions of bias.
According to most observers, the Electoral Commission was built with the expectation that the Democratic and Republican members would favor Tilden and Hayes, respectively. 1 1 1 Even so, it is still striking how casually Chief Justice Rehnquist refers to the partisan affiliation of the Justices as sufficient evidence of how they would decide the issue in 1876, notwithstanding their sworn obligation to adhere to the law instead of their own political preferences. For example, he refers to Justice Strong as "a Republican commissioner." ' 1 2 More generally, Rehnquist concludes that "on the one hand the justices were selected to add to the Commission a less obviously partisan aura than the congressional members, but they were named also with a view that the members of the Court were not wholly apolitical." 1 13 Rehnquist's statements are surprising given the explicit statutory oath the members of the Electoral Commission took to "impartially examine and consider all questions submitted to the commission." ' 14 Rehnquist's assumption also contradicts the minority view expressed during the debates involving the establishment of the Electoral Commission, which insisted that the Justices of the Supreme Court would never act in a partisan fashion. Senator Edmunds, for example, argued that the Justices "presumably would bring to the discharge of whatever duty you impose upon them the greatest amount of impartiality and respect for orderly government that could be found in any tribunal that might be selected." 1 15 But the members of the commission did not disappoint the majority's expectations, voting 8-7 along party lines. Hayes observed that "the decision is by a strictly party vote-eight Republicans against seven Democrats! It shows the strength of party ties." 1 6 Justice Bradley, in turn, was assumed that the Justices would be biased"); Peskin, supra note 95, at 72 (arguing that the Democrats "could not appeal to the law because the Republicans dominated the Supreme Court"); George C. ; see also id. at 898 (1877) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (arguing that the Supreme Court "would be regarded by men of all parties as a trustworthy repository" for the election decision because of the Court's "presumed impartiality"); id. at 888 (statement of Sen. Christiancy) (insisting that the justices serving on the Electoral Commission "will at once feel the importance, the vital importance of exercising judicial impartiality"); id. at 878 (statement of Sen. Conkling) (describing the effort to create "a provisional tribunal ... with impartiality as great as could be obtained by the instrumentalities of humanity"); id. at 141 (1876) (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (asking "how is it possible in this Republic to remove further from political bias, further from excitement, passion, [or] interest" than by entrusting it to the Supreme Court); Northrup, supra note 22, at 930 (indicating that Senator Thurman "believe [d] that those who expect partizan [sic] decisions from these judges will be disappointed"); id. at 931 (stating that Senator Bayard concluded that any "estimate that is founded on the political prejudice of any one of these judges will be found wanting").
116. ' and no one was the least bit surprised that they did so."123 Senator Edmunds was equally blunt, objecting that the congressional members of the Electoral Commission were "from the very nature of their positions, Senators and Representatives, more or less partisans, and whose judgments, therefore, must be, be they as pure as human nature ever is or can be, affected by the views and wishes they entertain of what they would like to have done."
124 That these assumptions persisted, despite the oath taken by each member of the Electoral Commission to judge the election dispute impartially, shows the persistence of claims of partisanship, which, of course, proved to be correct.
Considerations of the independence of those charged with deciding a contested election have a prospective element as well. Many Democrats and subsequent historians have complained that President Hayes rewarded many of the people who secured his election with federal offices. 125 Morris, for example, describes how Lew Wallace-a Republican who supervised the count in Florida and who later gained fame as the author of Ben-Hur-was " [i]n due time ... rewarded for his efforts, being appointed territorial governor of New Mexico in 1878."126 In fact, another study describes how Wallace became bitter waiting to receive an electoral dispute would place the Court "in a position where its motives will always be impugned").
122. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 248. 123. Id. at 220. 124. 5 Cong. Rec. 122 (1876) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); see also Keith Ian Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction 285 (1973) ("There was never any question that the congressional members of the commission would be strictly partisan in their judgments.").
125. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 54, at 202-13 (listing the offices to which the supporters of Hayes were later appointed); Morris, supra note 5, at 243-44 (describing how some "cabinet appointments went to men who, directly or indirectly, had helped Hayes successfully press his case before the Electoral Commission").
126. Morris, supra note 5, at 196.
appointment from President Hayes, and how one was forthcoming only after Wallace began to wreak havoc with Republican plans to retain a House seat in his native Indiana.1
27
The need for an unbiased and independent party to judge a contested election presumes that such a party exists. Congress went to extraordinary lengths to establish the Electoral Commission with the hope that it could rebut any concerns about partisanship, only to see the commission vilified when it ruled along party lines. But imagine what might have happened ifJustice Davis had served on the commission as had originally been planned. Davis was regarded as the ideal neutral party: A Republican appointed by his friend President Lincoln, Davis had since displayed an interest in the Democratic Party, and he enjoyed "the grace of impartiality." 12 8 Democrats were decidedly more enthusiastic than Republicans about Davis.
129 "Days were spent" by the joint committee that designed the Electoral Commission "in hair-splitting discussion of the political bias of Justice Davis."' 30 But Davis mooted that dispute by accepting the nomination of Democrats in the Illinois state legislature to serve in the United States Senate, thus depriving national Democrats of the key vote on the Electoral Commission and leading the way for Justice Bradley to replace him there. The Republicans tenaciously argued that Justice Davis was, to all intents and purposes, a Democrat, and that his selection should be charged up against the Democrats. Just as strenuously the Democratic committeemen insisted that he occupied a midway position between the parties, and therefore could with entire propriety serve as the fifth wheel of the commission coach.
Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 118 (quoting Northrup, supra note 22, at 927 canvassing board had acted fraudulently, it was just as if it had not acted at all."1 33 An understanding of these conflicting legal positions was essential for whoever decided the election.
For some, the existence of a legal dispute necessitates the involvement ofjudges. "This was a dispute; disputes are traditionally resolved by courts.
'134 So writes Chief Justice Rehnquist in explaining why "[i]t was quite natural for Congress to turn to the justices of the Supreme Court as members of the Electoral Commission."' 3 5 But Supreme Court Justices are not the only people capable of understanding the factual or legal issues raised in a contested election. As Judge Wilkinson explains, "our Structural Constitution confers the priceless values of self-governance upon many different entities."' 3 6 Thus "[t]he threshold question for a judge under the Structural Constitution is not, 'How should I resolve this case?' It is rather, 'To whom does the Constitution entrust the resolution of this issue?'"137 Chief Justice Rehnquist knows that, of course. The adjudication of contested elections is precisely the kind of question the Constitution sometimes commits to institutions besides federal judges. 138 The need for expertise, in short, does not inevitably point toward judges as the ideal parties to resolve contested elections. Indeed, Justice Bradley insisted in his Electoral Commission opinion that "it is a grave question whether any courts can thus interfere with the course of the election for President and Vice-President." 1 3 9 And Justice Breyer wrote in Bush v. Gore that "[h]owever awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an unelected Court."
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C. Timeliness
Any historical evidence uncovered today will not change the fact that Rutherford B. Hayes, not Samuel Tilden, served as the nineteenth President of the United States. Such evidence would be untimely, for elections must be resolved much more rapidly than most other matters presented to the courts, the legislature, or executive agencies. Consider that the median civil lawsuit requires more than nine years to be decided by a federal court, 1 4 ' or that Congress itself sometimes takes an entire session to resolve a dispute about the election of one of its members. The luxury of such time is not available in a presidential election when the dates imposed by law and mounting popular pressure may demand a decision before all of the evidence needed to make the best decision is available. As one observer of the 1876 election explained, "It was more important that the presidential issue should be decided effectively than that it should be decided rightly."' 4 2
The vote counting in the 1876 presidential election was constrained by two dates fixed by federal law. First, the electors had to meet by December 6. Second, the Constitution provided that the new president was to take office on March 4. The state canvassing boards hurried to complete their work by the December 6 deadline. In Florida, the board finished just hours before the deadline. Congress, then, acted to count the electoral votes in order to meet the March 4 deadline. The Electoral Commission's proceedings reflected the need to act in time for Congress to validate-or reject-the results.
Rehnquist writes that "it is not possible to say how time-consuming even an inquiry into the claims of fraud would have been, or how clearcut any result would have been" if the Electoral Commission had looked beyond the official certificates presented by the contested states.'
43 But Rehnquist suggests the process could have been lengthy, given the everexpanding scope of the questions involved:
The Democrats emphasized the likelihood of fraud-that returning boards had disallowed proper votes in order to reach a desired result. The Republicans spoke of intimidation of black voters-would this, too, be a permissible issue? If so, there was an added difficulty in that the chain of causation was much more indirect and difficult to prove. If night riders had gone through a town two weeks before the election, would claims be entertained that black voters refrained from voting because of this?1 44 Rehnquist only begins to identify the issues that could have been raised in a comprehensive review of the election. President Grant remarked that "if all eligible voters had been free to vote their preferences, the Republicans would have triumphed in Mississippi, North Carolina, and Arkansas." 1 45 Grant later added Alabama, Connecticut, and New York to the list of states in which Hayes "had been 'clearly elected by the legal vote."" 46 Ten years after the election, Hayes himself wrote:
In 1876 the Republicans were equitably entitled to the advantages of the Fifteenth Amendment under which, if it had been obeyed and enforced, they would have had a majority of the popular vote of the country and at least 203 electoral votes to Tilden's 166. This includes Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina among the Republican States.
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Then, in 1890, a Mississippi judge remarked that "[i] t is no secret that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in Mississippi since 1875-that we have been preserving the ascendancy of the white people by revolutionary methods."
48 How long would it have taken to judge those claims about what really happened on election day in 1876? Again, an effective means of resolving a disputed election must reach its conclusion quickly enough to establish who is entitled to serve in an office once it becomes vacant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether Hayes or Tilden actually "won" the election of 1876 will never be known, for it depends both upon evidence that has long since disappeared and assumptions about the proper scope of any inquiry into a fair election. And the focus upon the contested states of Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina obscures the many other historical contingencies that could have swayed the election one way or the other, such as the admission of Colorado as a state just in time for the new state's legislature to select three Hayes delegates.
